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1    Introduction  
Let’s begin with the seemingly obvious: We believe lots of things, and we believe 
things for reasons. What we believe often changes—we gain and lose beliefs over 
time—as do our reasons for believing—we revise and update our beliefs in 
response to new information. However, we don’t always believe for good reasons. 
Instead, we sometimes believe for bad reasons—reasons that are defective in some 
way, whether in kind, quality, quantity, or strength. But at least in general, when 
we believe for good reasons, we thereby put ourselves in a position to know. The 
world is mostly responsible for the rest. 
  Although it’s hard to deny the appeal of such intuitive reflections, talk of 
reasons for believing and believing for reasons can be confusing. That’s because 
there are several distinct strains in such talk, and failing to be sensitive to their 
differences—as well as similarities and relationship to each other—can easily lead 
one astray. It can also make it easy to engage in verbal disputes, or construct 
arguments whose plausibility or significance is merely apparent. This paper will be 
concerned with one such dispute: over the nature of so-called “motivating” 
reasons. Motivating reasons are standardly characterized as the reasons for which or 
on the basis of which we do things—where ‘doing things’ includes performing actions 
as well as forming (and sustaining) beliefs, intentions, and the like. Although 
special attention will be paid to cases involving belief, much of the paper will be 
concerned with motivating reasons more generally. 
 Motivating reasons are standardly distinguished from the reasons there are to 
do things, also known as ‘normative’ reasons. The class of motivating reasons is 
usually thought to be important because such reasons provide a distinctive kind of 
‘rationalizing’ explanation of our actions and attitudes, rendering them intelligible. 
They are also commonly thought to play an important role in determining whether 
an action or attitude is ‘properly based’ or ‘well-grounded’, and hence apt 
candidates for properties such as being creditworthy as well as being rational or 
justified. The idea is that in order to (e.g.) deserve credit for doing the right thing, 
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it’s not enough to just do the right thing—one also has to do it for the right reasons. 
The same goes for having justified or rationally held beliefs, intentions, and the 
like—one’s attitudes have to be properly based, or well-grounded.2 
 There is controversy over what exactly motivating reasons are, however. To 
illustrate: suppose that I’m curious what time the Lakers are playing, and check the 
newspaper to find out. I see the headline: ‘The NBA Finals: Lakers vs. Celtics—
8:30 PM EST’. Taking the newspaper to be reliable, I form the belief that the 
Lakers play at 8:30 PM. Question: what is my reason for so believing? Is it the 
fact—or, perhaps, the proposition—that the newspaper said so? Or is it my belief that 
newspaper said so, or perhaps instead something about my visual experience? 
Factualism is the view that motivating reasons are (generally non-mental) facts, 
propositionalism that they are propositions, and statism that they are mental 
states, or facts about such. 
 When faced with the question concerning my reason for believing the Lakers 
play at 8:30 PM, one may wonder: do we really have to choose? One may suspect 
not—that we’re being presented with something akin to a false dilemma. As we’ll 
see, my sympathies are with this skeptical view. But even assuming I’m wrong, we 
face another question: how do we decide between competing answers, and in 
particular whether motivating reasons are facts, propositions, states, or something 
else? To date, much of the debate has focused on a range of broadly linguistic 
considerations concerning what it is and isn’t appropriate to say about various cases 
using certain ordinary locutions. The default—and usually implicit—assumption 
seems to be that our ordinary talk concerning what is or isn’t someone’s reason for 
doing (believing, etc.) something directly and reliably tracks something of 
philosophical interest, and as a result should tightly constrain our theorizing. More 
than that, however, the assumption is that such talk reliably tracks some (kind of) 
thing, and that as a result it makes sense to ask what that thing is. 
 One might have doubts about such assumptions, however, as well as the 
underlying methodology of relying heavily on the propriety of certain ordinary 
locutions as a guide when engaging in substantive philosophical theorizing. Once 
again my sympathies are with the skeptical view. Although ordinary language has 
many virtues, reliably carving nature at its joints isn’t one of them. Hence the need 
for (well-motivated) technical terms—among other things—in better 
understanding and representing the relevant domain of inquiry. Although this 
general methodological perspective is commonplace, the extent to which it applies 
to various subdisciplines and debates in philosophy remains a matter of 
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contention. Nonetheless, I think it’s prudent to at least allow for the possibility that 
the things (objects, properties, relations, etc.) of central philosophical interest in a 
given domain fail to be reliably tracked by any particular bit of ordinary language—
at least prior to regimentation, and hence conversion into a technical term. One 
way of doing so is to use a non-ordinary language term or expression to pick out 
whatever the phenomenon of interest happens to be. It then becomes a further 
question whether the technical term is co-extensive with any expression of 
ordinary language, a question that can only be answered after careful investigation 
of (the uses of) both. 
 This sort of approach in epistemology is adopted by Pryor (2014), for instance. 
In defending the existence of immediately justified beliefs, he writes: 
Recall that a “justification maker” is defined to be whatever makes it 
epistemically appropriate for you to believe some propositions rather than 
others. We should be open to the possibility that terms like “evidence” and 
“reasons” do not express exactly that notion. They may express different, or 
more specific, notions. (214) 
Although this approach is common throughout philosophy, it’s hardly universal, 
and all too often methodological unclarity runs rampant.3 Debates about normative 
and motivating reasons—and the roles they’re supposed to play—are no exception. 
 One way of making progress, I think, is to clearly distinguish between the use 
of ‘reason(s)’ in its ordinary sense (or, rather, senses) and the use of ‘reason(s)’ in 
some other, more technical sense (or senses). As we’ll see below, I think all ordinary 
claims involving the count noun ‘reason(s)’ are essentially explanatory in nature, 
where the relevant notion of explanation is partly pragmatic. Very roughly, we can 
think of reasons in the ordinary sense as providing answers to why-questions.4 
                                                                  
3 An excellent case study is causation: see Paul and Hall (2013; chaps. 1-2). 
4 The view that reasons—and explanations more generally—are answers to why-questions is 
associated with Hempel (1965), Bromberger (1966) and van Fraassen (1980). As Jenkins 
(2008) notes, however, although some reasons may be naturally described as answers to 
why-questions, others are more naturally described as things that are cited in answers. Like 
Jenkins, I count both as things that (at least help) provide answers to why-questions. I also 
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answer to a ‘why’-question”, since it seems “likely that our everyday notions of explanation 
[and reasons] are vague, complex, and unlikely to succumb to any straightforward 
formalization” (71). It is these “everyday, fuzzy, notions” that I—like Jenkins—seek to 
illuminate. I therefore won’t be directly engaging with the large and illuminating literature 
on questions in formal semantics (cf. Cross and Roelofsen 2016), as well as other ways in 
which information can be structured in a discourse (cf. Roberts 2012a,b). 
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(The answers may be actual or possible, partial or full, etc.; I’ll be ignoring such 
complexities.) Why-questions are standardly entertained and investigated in a 
particular context, by particular people, people who in asking the question already 
possess, and thus presuppose, a huge amount of the background information. A 
successful answer to such a why-question will be one that helps make sense of the 
phenomenon being asked about, or render it intelligible, given the background 
information already possessed by the inquirer. Slightly more fully, following 
Woodward (2014, §6.1) we can say that an explanation in the pragmatic sense is 
one that depends in part on “facts about the interests, beliefs or other features of 
the psychology of those providing or receiving the explanation [or] the ‘context’ in 
which the explanation occurs”. 
 A non-pragmatic explanation is thus one that doesn’t depend on such things. 
Instead, it’s solely a matter of objective explanatory relations—whether they be 
causal, nomic, metaphysical, or something else—obtaining between facts ‘out there 
in the world’.5 A good pragmatic explanation will oftentimes be one that accurately 
captures (some of) the objective explanatory relations involved, but due to the 
vagaries of context, the limitation of our knowledge, and various situation-specific 
demands, the relationship between the two will usually be complicated. 
 Most philosophers who rely extensively on reasons-talk, however, seem to be 
after something different. Rather than pragmatic explanations, they are concerned 
with one or more theoretical roles a given thing or type of thing might play—roles 
that they at least implicitly take reasons-talk to track. In the case of normative 
reasons-talk, one of the relevant roles is that of being a source of normative support—
whether it be moral, prudential, epistemic, or something else—and in the case of 
motivating reasons-talk the relevant roles include that of rationalizing an action or 
attitude and that of being a premise in practical and theoretical deliberation. What’s more, 
it’s standardly assumed not only that (a) the things we regularly cite as reasons—
whether normative or motivating—play such roles, but also that (b) for any given 
role, there’s only one kind of thing that plays it. 
 I’ve argued elsewhere against the former assumption with respect to 
normative reasons—i.e. the assumption that the things we cite as normative 
reasons are themselves sources of normative support (Fogal 2016a; Fogal and Sylvan 
2017). More specifically, I’ve argued that rather than being sources of normative 
support (a metaphysical role), the things we ordinarily cite as normative reasons 
merely function as representatives of such sources (a cognitive and communicative 
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role). In this paper I’ll argue that something similar is true of motivating reasons. 
That is, I’ll argue that the things we ordinarily cite as motivating reasons do not 
themselves rationalize actions or attitudes, but instead merely function as 
‘representatives’ of a larger body of information or facts, and it is this larger body of 
information that does the real explanatory work. 
 The plan in what follows is thus to take a closer look at our ordinary thought 
and talk about motivating reasons, in an effort to better understand how it works. 
In doing so I aim to vindicate the coherence and utility of our thought and talk 
about motivating reasons, but also reveal some of its theoretical limitations and 
liabilities. This is an important first step in understanding whether—and if so, 
how—such thought and talk should inform or constrain our substantive theorizing. 
I begin, in §2, by distinguishing normative, motivating, and “merely” explanatory 
uses of ‘reason’, explaining more fully what unites and what distinguishes them. In 
§3, I focus specifically on the different ways ‘reason’ is used when talking about 
motivating reasons, distinguishing between claims concerning (what I call) factual 
reasons, teleological reasons, and primary reasons. All three are capable of 
providing distinctive, person-level explanations of agents’ actions and attitudes. 
They achieve this end in different ways, and hence should be distinguished, but 
this shouldn’t obscure the fact that they are characteristically used to answer the 
same sort of question, and that the answers they provide complement rather than 
compete with each other. In §4, I explain the relevance of the distinction between 
so-called ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases—i.e., cases where our beliefs and experiences are 
veridical versus cases where something goes wrong. In §5, I discuss complexities 
arising from the contextual variability and information-sensitivity of motivating 
reasons-claims. One of the upshots is that ordinary judgments about motivating 
reasons are at best a partial and defeasible guide to what really matters, and that 
so-called factualists, propositionalists, and statists are all partly right, as well as 
partly wrong, when it comes to the question of what motivating reasons are. 
2    The variety and unity of reasons 
It is standard to distinguish between the reasons why something is the case 
(‘explanatory reasons’), the reasons for which or on the basis of which someone does 
something (‘motivating reasons’), and the reasons for someone to do something 
(‘normative reasons’). There are a number of locutions associated with each. Here 
are three:6 
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Explanatory (ER): ‘r is a/the reason (why) q.’ 
 (‘The fact that Jim quit is one reason (why) he’s broke.’) 
Motivating  (MR): ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is {that q/to ψ}.’ 
 (‘Rachel’s reason for going into law is that it pays well.’ / 
 ‘Rachel’s reason for going into law is to make money.’) 
Normative (NR): ‘r is a reason (for S) to ϕ.’ 
 (‘The fact that it’s raining is a reason to stay inside.’) 
 
Although such distinctions are widely recognized, there is disagreement over the 
proper characterization of each and the relationship between them.7 Nonetheless, 
it’s commonly thought that a unified analysis can be provided. As Hyman (2015) 
puts it: 
 [T]he basic function of a reason is to explain something—in other words, to 
make something intelligible or understood—and more particularly to explain 
why something is the case. (134) 
On this view all reasons are explanatory reasons, and essentially so.8 As we’ll see, 
different ‘kinds’ of reasons merely differ in terms of what’s being explained (the 
explanandum), how it’s being explained (the kind or level of explanation), or 
what’s doing the explaining (the explanans). 
 (ER)-sentences are standardly taken to be doubly ‘factive’: the fact that Jim quit 
his job, for example, can’t be a reason he’s broke if he didn’t in fact quit, or if he’s 
not actually broke. Similarly for (MR)-sentences containing ‘that’-clauses. 9  If 
Rachel’s reason for going into law is that it pays well, for instance, it must be the 
case that Rachel is in fact going into law, and that going into law pays well. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
however, and hardly used outside action theory and online grammar forums (at least 
compared to other relevant phrases). Hence my limited, merely illustrative use of such talk. 
7 In drawing such distinctions it is often implicitly assumed that the count noun ‘reason(s)’ 
is polysemous—i.e. that (ER), (MR), and (NR) each involve different but semantically 
related senses of ‘reason(s)’. For further discussion, see Fogal (2016b: 284-288). 
8 This isn’t to say that the things that are reasons are essentially explanatory; rather, the claim 
is that the relational property of being a reason is essentially explanatory. Being a reason is a 
property that needn’t be—and often isn’t—essential to the things that have it. 
9 Not everyone agrees, of course. The most prominent naysayer is Dancy (2000), though 
others concur (see e.g. Drake this volume). Although I mostly side with orthodoxy, the issues 
here are subtle. For relevant discussion of non-factive readings of normally factive sentences 
(such as those containing verbs like ‘knows’ and ‘regrets’), see Stokke (2013) and Simons et 
al. (forthcoming). 
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However, unlike (MR)-sentences containing ‘that’-clauses, (MR)-sentences 
containing ‘to’-infinitivals are not doubly factive in this way—they can be true even 
though the eventuality expressed by the infinitival fails to obtain. Just because 
Rachel’s reason for going into law is to make money, for example, it doesn’t follow 
that she actually ends up making money. (Perhaps she ends up switching careers 
before ever receiving a paycheck.) And the same goes for (NR)-sentences—the fact 
that it’s raining can be a reason to stay inside even if one does not, in fact, stay 
inside. (It does, however, have to be raining.) 
Another way of making the point about the explanatory nature of reasons-
claims is in terms of questions and answers: to be a reason of any kind is, in part, 
to be an answer to a why-question, or at least to be capable of providing such. 
Different kinds of reasons can then be distinguished partly in terms of the kinds of 
why-questions they provide answers to. 
It’s worth noting that the fact that the count noun ‘reason’—along with 
‘explanation’ and ‘cause’—systematically pairs with the question word ‘why’ is not 
an isolated grammatical phenomenon, but instead part of a general, productive 
pattern. For there is a wide range of different question words, and nearly all have 
the same relationship to some other noun as ‘why’ has to ‘reason’ (along with 
‘cause’ and ‘explanation’).10 As Lawrence (2017) notes, the relationship is this: a 
given use of a question word or phrase in an indicative sentence can be replaced by 
a definite description employing a count noun corresponding to that question 
word, and the resulting sentence is felt to be truth-conditionally equivalent to the 
original. The question word-count noun relationships are summarized in Table 1, 
and examples of sentences that have two equivalent versions, one using a question 
word and one using a corresponding noun are provided in (1) below (cf. Lawrence 
2017: §1.3). 
 
 Table 1: Relationships between question words and corresponding nouns 
 
Question word  Corresponding Nouns 
how    way 
how many   number 
how much   quantity, amount 
when   time, moment, day, year, … 
where   location, place, position 
why    reason, cause, explanation 
who    person 
what   thing 
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(1) a.  Quietly is {how/the way} Mary entered. 
b.  Four is {how many/the number of} moons Jupiter has. 
c.  One cup is {how much milk is needed/the amount of milk needed}. 
d.  Ten p.m. is {when/the time} I go to bed. 
e. {Where my bicycle is/The location of my bicycle} remains to be  
determined.  
f.  We’ll never know {why/the reason} Oscar fled the country.  
g.  {Who/The person} Oedipus married was, tragically, his mother.  
h. {What/The thing} Harry most desired was his dinner. 
 
 Insofar as one understands uses of ‘reason(s)’ in terms of their role in asking 
and answering why-questions, it’s natural to be suspicious of the significance of 
the debate over what reasons are. There are at least two reasons for this. First, 
notice that while some of the nouns corresponding to question words—such as 
‘person’—may seem to function like ordinary nouns in denoting classes of well-
individuated objects, others—such as ‘way’ and ‘amount’—do not. One might then 
wonder whether an investigation into the ontology of reasons—in any non-
technical sense of ‘reason’—is more like an investigation into the ontology of 
persons or instead the ontology of ways and amounts. 
 Secondly, there is a wide range of different ‘things’ that we cite in answering 
questions. Even though it may be true that all ‘proper’ or ‘full’ answers to 
questions are expressible as complete declarative sentences, and thus propositional 
in nature, not all parts of a given answer will be of equal significance, and the parts 
that are most significant—i.e., the parts most relevant to answering the question—
vary in terms of what they are.11 This is precisely what we find with talk about 
reasons. As Alvarez (2009) notes:12 
When we turn to the question of the ontology of reasons, the first thing that 
strikes one is that things of many different kinds are said to be reasons. For 
example, facts, propositions, goals, events, things, states of things (including 
states of minds), features or aspects of the world, considerations (moral, 
aesthetic, legal, etc.), states of affairs, absences, etc., are all said to be reasons. 
So it seems that, despite the familiarity of the concept, reasons [are] not 
clearly assigned to any particular ontological category.  (187) 
Many philosophers resist this conclusion—including Alvarez—but I think we 
                                                                  
11 Cf. Lawrence (2017), Chapters 1-2. 
12 Cf. Hyman (2015: 133), who makes the point specifically regarding motivating reasons. 
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should accept it.13 Again, the key is to sharply distinguish between the use of 
‘reason(s)’ in its ordinary sense—or, rather, senses—and ‘reason(s)’ in some other, more 
technical sense. Reasons in the ordinary sense can be understood in broadly 
functional terms as whatever answers, or is capable of answering, the relevant why-
question. And it should come as no surprise that lots of different things are capable 
of doing that. Of course, nothing follows about which kinds of things (if any) play 
the various theoretical roles that are of primary philosophical interest, such as the 
role of being a source of normative support or that of rationalizing an action or 
attitude. What kinds of things play these roles is a further issue, and one to be 
settled on broadly theoretical—not linguistic—grounds. 
 The claim that all ordinary uses of ‘reason(s)’ are explanatory, or that all 
reasons provide answers to why-questions, is most controversial when it comes to 
normative reasons.14 What, if anything, is it that normative reasons help explain? 
Three main candidates have been defended.15 According to the first, for r to be a 
normative reason for an agent S to ϕ (where ϕ is some action or attitude) is for r to 
play a certain role in explaining why S ought to ϕ (Broome 2013).16 According to the 
second, for r to be a normative reason for S to ϕ is for r to play a certain role in 
explaining why it would be good for S to ϕ (Finlay 2014). And according to the 
third, for r to be a normative reason for S to ϕ is for r to play a certain role in 
explaining why there is reason (mass noun)—i.e., pro tanto normative support—for S to 
ϕ (Fogal 2016a). Unsurprisingly, I’m partial to the latter. On my view, normative 
reasons (count noun) are to be understood in terms of the role they play as 
‘sources’—or more generally ‘explainers’—of reason, analogously to how pleasures, 
lights, joys, and troubles (count noun) are to be understood in terms of the role 
they play as ‘sources’ of pleasure, light, joy, and trouble (mass noun), 
respectively.17 Just as it would be a mistake to analyse pleasure in terms of 
                                                                  
13 As does Hyman (2015: chaps. 5-6). Much of Hyman’s view is congenial to my own, and 
he does an admirable job of concisely criticizing the views of Anscombe, Davidson, and 
Dancy. 
14 For critical discussion, see Brunero (2013). 
15 I’m only considering accounts of normative reasons as (a special kind of) explanatory 
reasons that are intended to be fully general. Schroeder (2007), for instance, focuses 
specifically on practical reasons; the possibility of extending his account to epistemic reasons 
is merely hinted at in footnotes. 
16 Schroeter and Schroeter (2009) defend a related view of reasons as right-makers. 
17 Note that claims concerning what one has most or more reason to do are ubiquitous and 
not equivalent to the corresponding superlative and comparative claims concerning what 
one has most or more reasons to do. The same goes for quantitative claims concerning how 
much reason there is to do something, or threshold-y claims concerning whether there’s 
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pleasures, or light in terms of lights, so it would be a mistake to analyse reason in 
terms of reasons. 
 The main point, however, is that given any of the candidates above, we can 
provide a unified account of both normative and non-normative uses of the count 
noun ‘reason(s)’: to be a reason (of any kind) is to be something that helps explain 
something else. As noted above, different ‘kinds’ of reasons—normative, 
motivating, explanatory, and so on—merely differ in terms of what’s being 
explained (the explanandum), how it’s being explained (the kind or level of 
explanation), or what’s doing the explaining (the explanans). What distinguishes 
normative reasons, for example, is partly the kind of explanation involved—mere 
explanatory reasons are typically causal, while normative reasons are not—and 
partly their explanandum—what normative reasons help explain are normative 
facts. A parallel point can be made in terms of questions and answers: normative 
reasons provide answers to normative questions.  
3    Motivating reasons as explanatory reasons 
Whereas normative reasons are distinguished primarily in terms of what they 
explain—namely, normative facts—together with the kind of explanation they 
provide—non-causal—motivating reasons are distinguished primarily in terms of 
what does the explaining—contentful mental states play an essential role—
together with the kind or level of explanation provided—person-level. To provide 
an explanation of an agent’s action or attitude at the so-called ‘personal’ level 
invariably involves appealing to (the contents of) the agent’s beliefs, desires, 
intentions, experiences, and the like. A person-level explanation is distinct from, 
but compatible with, explanations at other levels, including the subpersonal level 
(e.g. in terms of lower-level cognitive processes) and the non-personal level (e.g. in 
terms of neurological activity).18 Slightly more fully, a person-level explanation is 
one that helps make sense of or rationalize the agent’s action or attitude, rendering it 
intelligible in light of how things are or appear to be from the agent’s perspective. 
The relevant kind of explanation will thus be ‘folk-psychological’ in nature—i.e., an 
explanation cashed out at least partly and implicitly in folk-psychological terms 
(beliefs, desires, knowledge, intentions, etc.). This is distinct from, but compatible 
with, explanations of other kinds, whether they be purely physical, historical, 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
enough reason to do it. For more on normative reason(s)-talk and the mass/count 
distinction, see Fogal (2016a) and Fogal and Sylvan (2017). 
18 This point about the compatibility of person-level explanations with explanations at other 
levels and of other kinds is a common one—cf. Dancy (2000: chap. 8)—though the 
relationship between them is vexed. 
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sociological, teleological, metaphysical, normative, or something else. 
 There are a number of complications concerning the class of motivating 
reasons. The first is that the standard label (‘motivating’) is misleading. Although 
we can have motivating reasons for belief, for example, it’s doubtful that we’re 
actually motivated to have beliefs—at least not in general. The same goes for other 
reasons-responsive attitudes, including intentions, preferences, and the like. 
 The second complication is also partly terminological. For as many have 
pointed out, philosophers have used the term ‘motivating reason’ in at least two 
importantly different ways.19 According to one standard usage, a motivating reason 
is a consideration “in light of which”, or “for which”, or “on the basis of which” 
one acts or forms an attitude, the sort of thing that plays the role of a premise in 
practical and theoretical reasoning, and so on. According to another, however, a 
motivating reason is a mental state, or combination of such states, that helps 
explain—in the right sort of way—why an agent does something or has some 
attitude. 
 Given this unfortunate terminological situation, it might be wise to follow 
Wallace’s (2003) advice and ban the term ‘motivating reason’ altogether. Because 
the term has become so entrenched, however, it may be preferable to draw a 
distinction between two kinds of motivating reasons, and the kinds of claims we 
use to specify them. Either way, terminology is called for that clearly and 
unambiguously marks the distinction. In deference to Davidson (1963), I’ll call the 
mental states that explain one’s action or attitude ‘primary reasons’ and reserve the 
term ‘guiding reasons’ for the other class of motivating reasons, which are not 
typically mental states (nor facts about them). 
 The set of guiding reasons can then be usefully subdivided into two: what I’ll 
call ‘factual reasons’ and ‘teleological reasons’.  Factual reasons are expressed by 
claims of the form ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is that p’, while teleological reasons are 
expressed by claims of the form ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is to ψ.20 Roughly put: a 
factual reason is a fact the awareness of which helps explain why the agent ϕ-s, 
whereas a teleological reason is a goal or purpose that an agent aims to achieve or 
promote by ϕ-ing, and which thereby helps explain her doing so.21 In both cases, 
however, there are other ways of saying more or less the same thing, including 
with ‘reason (why)’ and ‘because’/‘in order to’. Hence we say things like: 
                                                                  
19 For versions of this point, see Darwall (2003), Wallace (2003), Davis (2003), and Setiya 
(2014). 
20 In talking about ‘claims’ of different kinds I’ll be sliding back and forth between (e.g.) talk 
of sentences and talk of speech acts. This sloppiness is mostly a matter of convenience. I 
trust context will be sufficient to disambiguate. 
21 For further discussion of teleological reasons, see Sehon (2016: Part I). 
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(1)   Sasha’s reason for leaving was that a storm was coming. (factual) 
 (1’)  The reason (why) Sasha left was that a storm was coming. 
 (1’’)  Sasha left because a storm was coming. 
 
(2)  Sasha’s reason for leaving was to avoid the storm.  (teleological) 
 (2’)  The reason (why) Sasha left was to avoid the storm. 
 (2’’)  Sasha left in order to avoid the storm. 
 
Note that unlike claims of the form ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is to ψ’, not all claims of 
the form ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is that p’ specify a reason for an agent’s actions or 
attitudes in the relevant sense. We might say, for example, that Sasha’s reason for 
being late was that there was traffic. That there was traffic explains why Sasha was 
late, but being late (unlike leaving early) needn’t be something Sasha does—it can 
be something that happens to her.22 For present purposes, however, I’ll only be 
concerned with claims where the explanandum (i.e., S’s ϕ-ing) is an agent’s action 
or attitude. They’re the only ones that will count as guiding reasons-claims.23 
 It’s worth noting that (1) and (2)—like all factual and teleological reasons-
claims—are specificational sentences. (The same goes for (1’) and (2’).) According to 
one standard analysis, specificational sentences are a class of copular sentences 
where the pre-copular phrase (or subject) functions like a question and the post-
copular phrase (or complement) functions as its answer.24 Consider, for instance: 
 
What Olle wants is a new guitar.  (specificational) 
 
Compare it to the following Q&A-exchange: 
 
                                                                  
22 Cf. Setiya (2014) on ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ actions. 
23 I’ll also be ignoring the variety of different readings of ‘S’s reason for φ-ing is {that p/to 
ψ}’ that are possible given the flexibility and context-sensitivity of the possessive (‘S’s 
reason…’). (Hawthorne and Magidor (forthcoming) provide some examples.) A helpful 
diagnostic: the relevant factual and guiding reasons-claims stand or fall with the 
corresponding ‘reason (why)’- and ‘because’/‘in order to’-claims, as illustrated by (1)-(1’’) 
and (2’)-(2’’’). They’re all different ways of answering the same person-level why-question, 
where the explanandum is S’s φ-ing; other readings answer other questions. 
24 For a clear and accessible introduction to specificational sentences—along with a defense 
of the question-answer analysis—see Lawrence (2017). For discussion of specificational 
sentences of the form  ‘S’s CN is that p’, where CN is a cognitive nominal like ‘belief’ or 
‘desire’—along with some relevant remarks on ‘reason(s)’-talk—see Pryor (2007). 
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Q: What does Olle want? 
A: A new guitar. 
 
The similarities are obvious, and the question-answer analysis of specificational 
sentences explains why: the subject of a specificational sentence (e.g. ‘What Olle 
wants’) presents a question (‘What does Olle want?’) that the complement (‘a new 
guitar’) directly answers. The complement does so by specifying the subject—in this 
case, what it is that Olle wants. 
 This stands in contrast with predicational sentences, in which the complement 
describes or is true of the subject. For example: 
  
What Olle wants is expensive.  (predicational) 
 
Specificational and predicational sentences—or, rather, readings of sentences—also 
differ from equative (or ‘generalized identity’) sentences. These are ones in which 
the complement is identified or equated with the subject. For example: 
 
What Olle wants is what I want.  (equative) 
 
 Much more could be said, but what’s important for our purposes is just that 
guiding reasons-claims of the form ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is {that p/to ψ}’ are 
specificational claims. Their complements (‘that p/to ψ’) can thus be understood 
as providing a direct answer to the what-question associated with the subject 
(‘What is S’s reason for ϕ-ing?’), and an indirect answer to the intimately related 
person-level ‘why’-question (‘Why is S is ϕ-ing?’ or  ‘Why does S ϕ?’). The latter is 
achieved by means of the former. In brief, it’s because the reason specified by the 
complement of guiding reasons-claims—i.e., the ‘that’-clause in factual reasons 
claims and ‘to’-infinitival in teleological reasons-claims—always corresponds to the 
content of one of the agent’s action-guiding or, more generally, operative mental 
states. (I say ‘corresponds’ rather than ‘is identical’ advisedly; see below.) If Sasha’s 
reason for leaving was to avoid the storm, for example, then we may safely assume 
she wanted or intended to avoid the storm, and that this desire or intention was 
operative. Similarly, if Sasha’s reason for leaving was that a storm was coming, we 
may safely assume she believed (and arguably knew) that a storm was coming, and 
that this belief was operative. (We’ll return to this point below.) 
 To say that a given mental state was ‘operative’ is to say, in part, that it played 
a role in explaining why an agent did what she did. For as Davidson emphasized, 
just because someone did something they wanted to do, it doesn’t follow that they 
did it because they wanted to do it. Something else is needed for the relevant mental 
state to play a role in explaining the action, though what else is needed is subject to 
controversy. Davidson himself argued that the relevant mental states must cause 
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the action, and in order to count as intentional the action needed to be caused in the 
‘right way’ by those states. Others resist the causal picture.25 Nonetheless, there’s 
widespread agreement that whatever the explanatory role is, it has to be of the 
right kind, and hence incompatible with (among other things) deviant explanatory 
chains. 
 It’s commonly assumed that there’s a close relationship between guiding 
reasons and normative reasons. Although there’s debate over what the relationship 
is, pretty much everyone agrees it falls short of identity. After all, people who do 
things they shouldn’t do (e.g., kill innocent people) and believe things they 
shouldn’t believe (e.g., that vaccines are dangerous) still do and believe those 
things for reasons, and those reasons needn’t actually provide normative support of 
any kind for what they do or believe. Even though guiding reasons needn’t be 
normative reasons, however, many philosophers think guiding reasons have to be 
things (facts, propositions, considerations, whatever) the agent treats as normative 
reasons in their practical or theoretical deliberation. 
 The plausibility of this proposal depends on what it is to ‘treat’ something as a 
normative reason. If that just means that the consideration plays a certain role in 
the agent’s deliberation or motivational structure in virtue of being (or 
corresponding to) the content of one of their operative mental states, there’s little 
to quibble with. Oftentimes, however, it’s assumed that something more is 
involved. Some think the agent has to take the consideration to be a normative 
reason, where taking it to be a normative reason is a matter of believing it to be a 
normative reason or at least being disposed to respond to it in ways akin to those 
involved in so believing. But even this might be too much, at least insofar as small 
children and intelligent non-human animals are capable of doing and believing 
things for (purely motivating) reasons. 
 For another possible counterexample, consider a die-hard normative skeptic 
who is steadfast in her rejection of all things normative, and so doesn’t take 
anything to be a normative reason for anything else, even implicitly. Although she 
may well treat certain considerations as reasons in the aforementioned sense, that’s 
just for those considerations to figure as (or correspond to) the contents of her 
operative mental states. It’s not obvious why any real or apparent normativity 
would need to enter into such a picture, however, and so cases like this may cast 
doubt on any alleged non-trivial necessary connection between normative and 
guiding reasons.26 This would be compatible with there being a close connection 
                                                                  
25 Whether mental states are causes is a matter of contention, though mental states might 
still causally explain even if they aren’t causes (cf. McLaughlin 2013). 
26 Lord (forthcoming; chap. 6), replaces the ‘taking’ requirement with one that requires 
agents ‘conceive’ of their motivating reasons as a normative reason. He then proceeds to 
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between normative and guiding reasons in practice, since most agents who act for 
reasons may take themselves to be acting on the basis of normative reasons. And if 
their action is in fact appropriately related to normative reasons, that will of course 
be a good thing; it’ll be a case of what Mantel (2013) calls ‘normatively apt action’, 
understood as a kind of achievement. Something similar could then be said of 
agents who take themselves to believe (intend, etc.) for good reasons, and as a 
matter of fact do (cf. Lord forthcoming: chaps. 5 and 6). This would nonetheless 
be a contingent fact about particular agents and their guiding reasons, not one that 
generalizes to all agents and guiding reasons as such. 
 A related assumption is that guiding reasons are at least the same kind of thing as 
normative reasons, since our reasons for doing (believing, intending, etc.) things 
have to be the sorts of things that are capable of being—though they needn’t 
actually be—normative reasons, and vice versa.27 Mantel (2014) calls this the 
Identity Thesis, and argues against it. Although everyone should agree that we’re 
capable of acting and believing for good reasons, and that normative reasons are in 
some sense ‘good’, it’s far from clear that the Identity Thesis is needed to do justice 
to the intuitive thoughts standardly taken to motivate it, as opposed to some 
weaker, though still systematic, correspondence between them.28 After all, if what 
I’ve suggested so far is correct, guiding and normative reasons are clearly 
functionally distinct: whereas normative reasons help explain normative facts, 
guiding reasons help explain actions and attitudes. And it’s not clear why we 
should expect the sorts of things that perform one role to also (and exclusively) 
perform the other. 
 It may be, however, that the kinds of things that we normally cite as agents’ 
reasons using factual reasons-claims—i.e., facts about the world—turn out to be 
the same kinds of things as normative reasons, or at least normative reasons of a 
certain (e.g. objective) kind.29 But even so, this wouldn’t be in tension with my 
earlier claim that such facts are only explanatorily relevant to an agent’s action or 
attitude insofar as the agent is aware of them, and insofar as the relevant mental 
states are operative in the relevant circumstances. In addition, it’ll remain a further 
question whether the things we cite as factual reasons are the same kind of thing 
as the contents of our mental states. Ordinary language is an imperfect guide in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
offer a suitably deflationary dispositional account of ‘conceptions’ that promises to 
circumvent worries about dogs, children, and die-hard normative skeptics. In order to do so, 
however, there’s a worry that the account ends up being too deflationary. 
27 This is what Dancy (2000) calls the “normative constraint”. 
28 See also Wallace (2003). 
29 For some worries, though, see Mantel (2015). 
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this respect, since ‘that’-clauses can be put to multiple uses.30  This includes 
specifying the content of mental states (e.g. ‘John’s belief was that p’) as well as 
expressing facts about the world (e.g. ‘The fact that p…’), and many of these uses 
may differ in subtle ways. Similar considerations apply to what is expressed using 
‘to’-infinitivals. For present purposes, however, I needn’t take a firm stand one way 
or the other concerning the ontological relationship (if any) between guiding 
reasons, normative reasons, and the content of our mental states. 
 We’re now in a position to better understand the notion of a primary reason. 
For whereas guiding reasons correspond to the contents of an agent’s operative 
mental states, primary reasons are those mental states (or facts about them). Hence 
we say things like: 
 
(3) The reason (why) Sasha left was that she thought there was a storm coming. 
 (3’)  Sasha left because she thought there was a storm coming. 
 
(4) The reason (why) Sasha left was that she wanted to avoid the storm. 
 (4’)  Sasha left because she wanted to avoid the storm. 
 
As the above examples illustrate, there’s a close connection between guiding 
reasons and primary reasons, and—as we’ll see in the next section—claims about 
each are best understood as providing complementary explanations rather than 
competing ones. Summarily put: primary reasons-claims are used to highlight an 
agent’s contentful mental state(s)—i.e., those that play a certain privileged 
explanatory role—while guiding reasons-claims are used to highlight the content of 
those states. What unites the two kinds of claims—and what justifies grouping 
them under the common label of ‘motivating reasons’—is that they are both used 
to achieve the same end, namely, that of providing distinctive, person-level 
explanation of agents’ actions and attitudes. They achieve this end in different 
ways, and hence should be distinguished, but this shouldn’t obscure the fact that 
they are characteristically used to answer the same sort of why-question, and that 
the answers they provide are complementary rather than in competition. 
 By way of summary, here’s a modified chart from Grice (2001) listing the four 
main ‘types’ of reasons along with some canonical forms and key features: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
30 Cf. Pryor (2007) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002: chap. 11, §§1-4). 
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 4    Good cases versus Bad cases 
Given the distinction between guiding and primary reasons-claims, it’s natural to  
wonder: why make one type of claim rather than another? The answer: it depends. 
In the case of teleological vs. primary reasons-claims, there’s little of substance 
separating them—they communicate much the same thing, though in different 
ways. Again, compare (2) to (4): 
 
(2)  Sasha’s reason for leaving was to avoid the storm.      (teleological) 
 (2’’)  Sasha left in order to avoid the storm. 
 
(4)  The reason Sasha left was that she wanted to avoid the storm.       (primary) 
 (4’’)  Sasha left because she wanted to avoid the storm. 
 
Whereas (2) cites Sasha’s goal or purpose, (4) cites Sasha’s corresponding directive 
attitude. However, in using (2) a speaker will normally presuppose what is made 
explicit in (4)—namely, that Sasha wanted to avoid the storm, and that this desire 
was operative in the relevant circumstances.31 In using (2), then, a speaker implicitly 
communicates what is explicitly communicated by (4). The main difference is that 
the focus is on the goal itself, rather than the directive attitude, which is 
backgrounded. Ditto for (2’’) and (4’’). 
 The relationship between factual and primary reasons is similar, subject to a 
caveat to be discussed later. For just as (2) implicitly communicates what is 
explicitly communicated by (4), so (1) implicitly communicates what is explicitly 
                                                                  
31 Here and elsewhere I rely on an intuitive notion of speaker presupposition and related 
notions. There are a number of important subtleties that I lack the space to discuss. For an 
introduction to presupposition (and its failure), see Beaver and Geurts (2014). For 
further—and particularly relevant—discussion of presupposition and factive constructions, 
see Simons et al. (forthcoming). 
Type of reason Canonical forms—not exhaustive Features 
(1) Purely 
explanatory 
‘The reason (why) A is that B’ 
‘That B is a reason (why) A’  
‘A because B’ 
(a) Factive with respect to ‘A’ and ‘B’  
(b) ‘Reason’ used as count, not mass, noun  
(2) Normative ‘That B is a reason (for X) to A’ 
‘That B is a reason X has to A’ 
‘There is (a) reason (for X) to A 
because B’ 
(a) Factive with respect to ‘B’ but not ‘to A’ 
(b) ‘Reason’ used as count and mass noun  
(3) Primary ‘That X B-s is a reason (why) X A-s’ 
‘The reason (why) X A-s is that X B-s’ 
‘X A-s because X B-s’ 
(a) Factive with respect to ‘X A-s’ and ‘X B-s’ 
(b) ‘Reason’ used as count, not mass noun  
(4) Guiding 
(Factual / 
Teleological) 
‘X’s reason for A-ing is that B’ / 
‘X’s reason for A-ing is to B’ 
’X A-s because / in order to B’ 
(a) Factive with respect to ‘X A-s’ and ‘that 
B’ but not ‘to B’ 
(b) ‘Reason’ used as a count, not mass, noun 
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communicated by (3): 
 
(1) Sasha’s reason for leaving was that a storm was coming.             
 (1’’) Sasha left because a storm was coming.             (factual) 
 
(3) The reason Sasha left was that she {thought/knew} a storm was coming. 
 (3’’) Sasha left because she {thought/knew} a storm was coming. (primary) 
 
In using (1), a speaker will normally take it for granted that Sasha believed—and 
indeed knew—that there was a storm coming, and that this belief was operative in 
the circumstances leading to her action. Whether knowledge of the relevant fact is 
strictly required in order for factual reasons claims to be felicitous is subject to 
debate.32 It’s nonetheless plausible that in order for an agent’s reason to be that p 
that subject must have a (presumably justified) true belief that is connected to the 
fact that p in the right sort of way, and that this will normally suffice for 
knowledge. 
 Notice that in using (1) it will normally be taken for granted not just that 
Sasha believed there was a storm coming, but also that she wanted to avoid it, and 
that this desire—like the belief—was operative. Similarly, with (2) it will be 
assumed not just that Sasha wanted to avoid the storm, but also that she believed a 
storm was coming, and that this belief—like the desire—was operative. The 
presence of the relevant action-guiding belief and desire will thus normally be 
presupposed by the use of both (1) and (2). The main difference, again, is that 
whereas factual reasons-claims like (1) highlight the content of an operative 
cognitive state (belief, knowledge, etc.), teleological reasons-claims like (2) 
highlight the content of an operative directive state (desire, intention, etc.). I say 
‘highlight’ rather than ‘identify’ in order to remain neutral on the exact relationship 
between the fact/goal cited in (1)/(2) and the content of the agent’s mental states. 
As noted above, I do not assume that the relationship is one of identity. I only 
claim that there is a systematic correspondence, and that in using guiding reasons-
claims we exploit this fact for the purposes of communication. 
 The other main difference between teleological and factual reasons-claims 
(noted at the outset) is that factual reasons-claims are normally (doubly) factive.33 
The claim below, for example, will be acceptable only if it is, in fact, my birthday—
                                                                  
32 Williamson (forthcoming), Hawthorne and Magidor (forthcoming), and Hyman (2015) 
think knowledge is required. Locke (2015) demurs, appealing to fake barn-style cases. 
33 The ‘normally’ hedge is in recognition of the fact that there are non-factive uses of (5)/(6) 
below—albeit ones that merit special treatment. For the purposes of this paper I’m focusing 
on the central, factive use. 
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which we may suppose it is—and my grandma is aware of that fact: 
 (5)  Grandma’s reason for sending me a card is that it’s my birthday. 
Likewise, if Bob isn’t Superman—which, we may suppose, he’s not—then it would 
be unacceptable to say: 
 (6) #Bob’s reason for believing that he can fly is that he’s Superman. 
This illustrates a general pattern: in so-called ‘Good’ cases—like that involving 
Grandma—where the relevant agent’s beliefs and experiences are veridical and 
appropriately connected to the facts, factual reasons-claims are good. But in ‘Bad’ 
(or ‘Error’) cases—like that involving Bob—where the relevant agent’s beliefs and 
experiences are not veridical or not appropriately connected to the facts, factual 
reasons-claims are bad. Bad cases include cases of hallucination and illusion, as 
well as more humdrum cases of false belief, whether justified or not. 
 Notice, however, that in both Good and Bad cases we have the option of citing 
the subject’s contentful mental states in explaining their actions or attitudes.34  For 
example: 
 
 (7) The reason Grandma sent me a card is that she believes it’s my birthday. 
 (7’)  Grandma sent me a card because she believes it’s my birthday 
 
(8)  The reason Bob believes he can fly is that he believes he’s Superman. 
 (8’)  Bob believes he can fly because he believes he’s Superman. 
 
Accordingly, in Good cases, where the subject’s operative doxastic attitudes are 
true and appropriately connected to the facts, we have a choice between the two 
kinds of explanatory claims, whereas in the Bad case, where the subject’s operative 
doxastic attitudes are not true, we don’t—the factual reasons-claim is infelicitous. 
This is to be expected given that factual reasons-claims—unlike teleological 
reasons-claims—are normally replaceable with backwards-looking (or 
retrospective) ‘because’-claims, and ‘because’-claims are generally taken to be 
factive with respect to both the explanans and explanandum. Teleological reasons-
claims, in contrast, are generally replaceable with forward-looking (or prospective) 
                                                                  
34 In the good case we have intermediate options available. For example, instead of citing 
worldly facts or states of belief and desire, we might cite facts about appearances: 
 (*) The reason Gail believes the animal is a zebra is that it appears to have stripes. 
 (**) Gail believes the animal is a zebra because it appears to have stripes. 
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‘in order to’-claims, and these are not factive with respect to the explanans.35 
 Although in Good cases, unlike Bad cases, we have a choice of explanatory 
locution, factual reasons-claims are nonetheless generally favoured over primary 
reasons-claims—i.e., ones that cite the agent’s mental states. Why? A simple 
answer suggests itself: because factual reasons-claims are more informative than 
primary ones. In particular, factual reasons-claims communicate implicitly what 
primary reasons-claims communicate explicitly—namely, that the agent has an 
operative attitude with a certain content—while also communicating something 
extra about the world. Given this, there is a fairly straightforward, broadly Gricean 
story to tell about why factual reasons-claims are commonplace, and why they 
should be seen as offering explanations that complement rather than compete with 
explanations provided by primary reasons-claims. It’s not an either-or. Both 
provide person-level, folk-psychological explanations of the agent’s action or 
attitude, but whereas primary reasons-claims provide such explanations directly by 
citing the agent’s operative mental states, factual reasons-claims (like teleological 
ones) do so indirectly by citing a fact the agent is aware of (or, in the case of 
teleological reasons, a goal she has), thereby presupposing—without citing—the 
relevant mental states. The latter conveys everything the former does, and more 
besides. Hence the increased informativeness and conversational relevance (in 
Good cases) of factual reasons-claims, which can be understood as providing 
hybrid worldly/folk-psychological explanations rather than just folk-psychological 
ones like primary reasons-claims. 
 It’s worth emphasizing that the choice between explanatory items and 
locutions is a general feature of our explanatory practice.36 Suppose, for example, 
that a bridge collapses and you want to know why. I might tell you about the 
physical or structural properties of the bridge immediately prior to the collapse, 
and why it was in a weakened state, or I might instead tell you about how it was 
originally built, what the engineers did wrong, and how the condition of the bridge 
degraded over time. The former explanation is more proximal while the latter is 
more distal, but both serve the general purpose of explaining why the bridge 
                                                                  
35 Not all ‘because’-claims are backwards-looking. Jenkins and Nolan (2008), for example, 
provide a litany of examples in which something that occurs at t1 is explained by appealing 
to something which occurs at a later time t2. E.g.: 
 (1)   I am tidying my flat today because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. 
As with other ‘because’-claims, such explanations are generally factive: in order for (1) to be 
true, for example, it has to be that my brother is in fact coming to visit tomorrow. (Again, 
there are subtleties concerning factivity that I’m ignoring.) There are also synchronic 
‘because’-claims, as metaphysical explanations (among others) make clear. 
36 See, for example, Lewis (1986). 
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collapsed. It would be a mistake to think they are somehow in competition with 
each other qua explanations, even though in some contexts one might be more 
appropriate or relevant than the other, depending on our particular interests and 
background information. 
5    Contextual Variability and Explanatory Clusters 
I take it to be fairly obvious that the presence of the relevant attitudes is normally 
presupposed by guiding reasons-claims (or, rather, by the speaker making such 
claims). But in case evidence is needed: when making such claims it’s normally 
infelicitous to deny the presence of the relevant attitudes. For example: 
 
 (1*)  #Sasha’s reason for leaving was that a storm was coming, even though she  
 didn’t {know/believe} that a storm was coming. 
 (1**) #Sasha left because a storm was coming, even though she didn’t  
 {know/believe} that a storm was coming. 
 
(2*)  #Sasha’s reason for leaving early was to avoid the storm, even though she  
 didn’t {want/intend} to avoid it—that wasn’t her aim.37 
 (2**) #Sasha left in order to avoid the storm coming, even though she  
 didn’t {want/intend} to avoid it. 
 
The infelicity of (1*) and (2*) is to be expected given that motivating reasons-
claims characteristically provide answers to person-level, folk-psychological why-
questions. By explicitly denying the presence of the relevant mental state, claims 
like (1*) and (2*) fail to answer to the relevant kind of question.38  
 It’s worth emphasizing that given what we know about the nature of our 
explanatory practices in general, in which surprisingly few facts usually suffice—for 
communicative purposes, not metaphysically—to explain complicated facts or 
events, it should come as little surprise that in making guiding reasons-claims we 
take certain other facts for granted. Indeed, pretty much all ordinary explanatory 
                                                                  
37 I include the additional material at the end to force what Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) 
call the ‘strong’ (or ‘operative’) rather than the ‘weak’ reading of verbs like ‘want’. 
38 At least in the absence of special circumstances. Note also that the only way to felicitously 
continue (1**)—and similar sentences starting with ‘the reason Sasha left’ instead of ‘Sasha’s 
reason’—will turn it into a non-personal explanatory claim. (Thanks to Olle Risberg for this 
observation.) For example: 
(1***)    Sasha left because there was a storm coming. She wasn’t actually aware of the  
 storm, but she somehow always gets sick before the weather turns foul. 
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claims—‘A explains B’, ‘B because A’, etc.—are made, and hence to be evaluated, 
relative to a large body of background information or facts, and the cited fact alone 
will rarely if ever fully explain the explanandum. The things we cite as, explanans—
i.e. as the things that do the explaining (e.g. A)—are thus almost always merely 
part, and oftentimes a very small part, of a much larger body of information or 
facts, and it’s the latter that constitutes the ‘full’ explanation of the explanandum 
(e.g. B), if anything does.39 
 Note that we typically have a certain amount of leeway in deciding which 
explanatorily relevant facts/events/states/goals/etc. to cite as reasons in providing 
an explanation of something, and which to merely treat as part of the informational 
background. The promotion of explanatorily relevant facts (etc.) to status of 
explicit explanans is thus partly up to us, with the choice being constrained—but 
not always determined—by what happens to be particularly salient or otherwise 
relevant, among other things. (That’s not to say that the explanatory relevance of 
those facts is up to us; it’s not.) 
 Suppose, for example, that Gail is at the zoo and sees an animal with black and 
white stripes. She recognizes the pattern as one that is characteristic of zebras, and 
so comes to believe the animal is a zebra. Given this background information, it 
would be acceptable to say either of the following: 
 
(9)  Gail’s reason for believing the animal is a zebra is that it has stripes. 
 (9’)  Gail believes the animal is a zebra because it has stripes. 
 
(10)  Gail’s reason for believing the animal is a zebra is that zebras have stripes. 
 (10’)  Gail believes the animal is a zebra because zebras have stripes. 
 
But despite the felicity of (9) and (10), it would be decidedly odd to cite both facts 
individually as guiding reasons: 
 
 (11)  #One of Gail’s reasons for believing the animal is a zebra is that it has  
 stripes, and another is the fact that zebras have stripes. 
 (11’) #‘Gail believes the animal is a zebra because it has stripes, and also   
 because zebras have stripes. 
 
Intuitively, (11) is guilty of something like explanatory ‘double counting’, since 
neither fact cited is explanatorily relevant on its own, independently of the other. 
                                                                  
39 This is oversimplifying, since there’s usually no such thing as the full explanation of 
something—cf. Lewis (1986). Here, as elsewhere, I’m ignoring additional complexities. 
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Instead, it’s only when the two facts are (at least implicitly) taken together that any 
amount of explanatory ‘oomph’ is generated. Hence the acceptability of citing the 
facts collectively as her reason: 
 
(12)  Gail’s reason for believing the animal is a zebra is that it has stripes like a  
 zebras does. 
 (12’)  Gail believes the animal is a zebra because it has stripes like a  
 zebras does. 
 
 The same sort of contextual variability arises with teleological reasons-claims, 
as well as primary reasons-claims. To illustrate the latter: while (3) and (4) above 
are felicitous, citing both mental facts individually as reasons is not: 
 
(13)  #One reasons (why) Sasha left is that she thought a storm was coming,
 and another was that she wanted to avoid it. 
 (13’)  #Sasha left because she thought a storm was coming, and also 
 because she wanted to avoid it. 
 
As before, (13) is guilty of something like explanatory double counting, with 
neither psychological fact being explanatorily relevant on its own. Instead, it’s only 
when both are taken together—whether explicitly or not—that explanatory 
relevance is achieved.40 The full grounds of explanatory relevance thus belong (as 
before) to a larger cluster of facts that includes both, and more besides. 
 The moral: claims about motivating reasons, like nearly all explanatory claims, 
are highly context-sensitive and influenced by pragmatic considerations. We should 
therefore be wary of assigning undue significance to any particular use of sentences 
of the form ‘S’s reason for ϕ-ing is {that p/to ψ}’. Instead, the things—facts, states, 
goals, propositions, etc.—that we cite as guiding and primary reasons are best 
understood as functioning as (something like) representatives of explanatory 
clusters, where an ‘explanatory cluster’ is a body of information or facts that taken 
as a whole—and only taken as whole—is explanatorily relevant to some action or 
attitude. For reasons having to do with communicative efficiency as well as our 
informational limitations, we rarely if ever mention entire clusters. Instead, we 
single out one or two particularly relevant or accessible representatives and ascribe 
responsibility to them. As a consequence, whatever it is that we decide to single 
out in a particular context should not, by itself, be taken as indicative of anything 
                                                                  
40 As before it would be fine to cite the facts collectively as a primary reason—something 
Davidson was sensitive to. See also Hornsby (2008: 246, n. 4). 
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metaphysically special. In a different conversational context—one differing in terms 
of shared background information, preceding discourse, etc.—some other 
representative of the very same cluster that explains the relevant action or attitude 
might be more salient, or otherwise relevant, and hence be referenced instead.41 
 On the picture suggested so far, it is natural to expect ordinary explanatory 
thought and talk to be governed by something like the following general norm (cf. 
Swanson 2010): 
 
USE GOOD REPRESENTATIVES 
When you ascribe some explanatory responsibility for A to an explanatory 
cluster relevant to A, use good representatives of that cluster for the purposes 
at hand. 
 
The ‘goodness’ of a potential representative will be a function of the amount of 
information it provides—either directly or indirectly, given the background 
information—about the relevant explanatory cluster, as well as the economy with 
which it provides that information. Ceteris paribus, the better a representative 
satisfies this dual constraint, the better a representative it will be. The relative 
‘goodness’ of a potential representative will thus vary from context to context—and 
even within a context—depending on the interests of and background information 
shared by the conversational participants, including whether (and if so, which) 
other representatives have already been used. In the case of motivating reasons-
claims, however, there’s an important further constraint—the relevant cluster(s) 
have to be capable of providing a rationalizing, person-level explanation, and the 
representatives we select have to be appropriately related to such. 
 The view of reasons as representatives—i.e., the view that the things we 
ordinarily cite as reasons function as representatives of explanatory clusters—thus 
has a ready explanation of the acceptability of (9)-(10) and (12) as well as the 
defectiveness of (11) and (13). For in each case there are at least two facts 
belonging to the same explanatory cluster, either of which is suitable on its own to 
serve as a good representative for the purposes at hand. (Hence the acceptability of 
(9) and (10).) However, once one of the relevant facts is cited as a reason—and 
hence used as a representative—it robs the other of its representative role. To 
nonetheless cite both facts individually as reasons would thus be misleading, since 
                                                                  
41 Since this is a general feature of our explanatory practice, it shouldn’t be surprising that 
it’s true not just of guiding reasons-claims but also of normative reasons-claims as well as 
of causal claims. For defence of the latter two points, see Fogal (2016a) and Swanson 
(2010) respectively. The discussion here and immediately below generalizes observations 
made by Swanson in the case of causal talk, and mirrors the discussion in Fogal (2016a: §4). 
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it would wrongly imply that the facts belong to separate explanatory clusters. 
(Hence the defectiveness of (11) and (13).) In contrast, it’s perfectly fine to cite 
both facts collectively as a reason, since together they function as a good 
representative. (Hence the acceptability of (12).) 
 One upshot is that rather than trying to explain away the variability in what 
we cite as motivating reasons or the kind of linguistic constructions we use, we 
should embrace it. Though the means vary, the goal remains the same: to provide a 
person-level, folk-psychological explanation of an agent’s action or attitude. While 
in many contexts it might make sense to cite a particular worldly (or non-mental) 
fact in doing so—one the agent is aware of and responsive to—in other contexts it 
might make more sense to cite the agent’s mental states, and in still others it 
might be most useful to cite the content of those states. Indeed, we might have a 
choice: all that’s needed is something—a fact, state, proposition, goal, whatever—
that can serve as a good representative of one or more explanatory cluster(s) 
relevant to the case at hand, and there may be equally good representatives, or 
equally good explanatory clusters. Different ways of using ‘reason’ can all be seen 
as ways of focusing on different aspects of those clusters, and hence different kinds 
of things. What unifies our motivating reasons-claims is the role of ‘reason’ in 
providing person-level explanations, not any common underlying ontology. And 
even though the acceptability of such claims will vary depending on the 
contextually relevant body of information, the underlying facts that we are (or at 
least should be) primarily interested in—what I’ve called the ‘explanatory 
clusters’—remain constant. 
 None of this is to deny that there will usually be fairly severe constraints on 
eligible referents of ‘reasons(s)’ in particular contexts or in particular linguistic 
constructions—as with explanatory claims in general, not just anything goes. But 
given that the relevant explanatory clusters are often complex and varied, we 
should expect there to be variability in terms of both (a) what particular thing is 
cited as a reason and (b) the kind of thing it is that gets cited. Instead of assigning 
undue significance to any particular judgment (or set of judgments) involving a 
motivating use of ‘reason(s)’, then, we as theorists should focus our attention on 
the nature, composition, and relevance of explanatory clusters—the real sources of 
explanatory oomph—that motivating reasons only imperfectly point to. 
6    Conclusion 
Insofar as we’re interested in providing a person-level explanation of an agent’s 
action or attitude, we need information about their mental life. In particular, we 
need to know something about which mental states are (or were) operative. This 
information provides us with a proximal person-level explanation of the agent’s 
action or attitude (cf. Wedgwood 2017: chap. 7). But it would be a mistake to 
think that this is the only kind of motivating reasons-explanation we can or should 
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provide. On the contrary, given what I’ve argued for, we should expect there to be 
plenty of good motivating reasons-explanations that cite things other than mental 
states, whether they be facts, propositions, objects, states of affairs, or something 
else. It’s true—and important—that in order to provide an explanation of the right 
kind (i.e., person-level), such explanations require the presence of the relevant 
mental states. But sometimes we’re interested in acquiring or providing a fuller and 
more distal explanation of an agent’s action or attitude, and we can do so by 
appealing to certain facts that the agent is aware of. These are the contexts in 
which factual reasons-claims are most natural. Other times, however, we’re 
interested primarily in what exactly an agent wants or intends to do, and hence in 
the content of their relevant directive attitude. These are the contexts in which 
teleological reasons-claims are most natural. In neither case is there anything 
wrong or superfluous with the claim in question, and it’s a mistake to think either 
is in direct competition with primary reasons-claims that cite the mental states 
themselves.42 The variety of claims we have at our disposal simply reflects the 
variety of our possible explanatory interests.  
 This ecumenical conclusion shouldn’t obscure the point, however, that primary 
reasons are in a meaningful sense primary when it comes providing person-level 
explanations. For everyone should agree that facts about contentful (and operative) 
mental states are essential ingredients in providing proximal folk-psychological 
explanations, and their presence is always presupposed by factual and teleological 
reasons-claims. It’s in this sense—but this sense only—that primary reasons are 
primary. 
                                                                  
42 Contra Turri (2009). 
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